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Why Teach International Family Law 
in Conflicts? 
William L. Reynolds* 
ABSTRACT 
Professor Reynolds sets forth a challenge to conflicts 
professors: to teach international family law in their conflict of 
laws classes. At present, many conflicts professors avoid 
teaching international family law, in part because the study 
of this subject is complicated by several statutes addressing 
particularly difficult issues. Ignoring international family law 
is unwise, because many United States citizens and lawyers 
are likely to confront such problems. 
Moreover, this Article suggests several additional 
reasons for including international family law in the general 
conflicts course. First, litigants entangled in divorce and 
custody proceedings with international complications face 
high financial and emotional costs; knowing how to assist a 
client embroiled in such a matter is therefore important. 
Second, the topic of international family law provides 
considerable material beyond the reach of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution; as such, this 
topic regularly raises questions regarding the enforcement of 
judgments from foreign countries. Third, the topic raises 
innumerable cross-cultural questions that require students to 
examine United States policy. Fourth, this cross-cultural 
nature of international family law exposes students to other 
cultures and to writings of non-conflicts scholars. This 
interdisciplinary perspective on conflicts «solutions" raises 
fundamental questions about the scholarship on conflict of 
laws. Finally, international family law provides interesting 
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material for reviewing an array of conflicts issues. Thus, 
Professor Reynolds invites conflicts professors to tap the vast 
unmined vein of international family law to improve their 
conflicts courses. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. WHY TEACH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS MATERIALS?..... 412 
II. WHY TEACH FAMILY LAW?......................................... 413 
III. WHY TEACH INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW?................... 414 
A. It's Important.............................................. 415 
B. It's Liberating.............................................. 415 
C. It's Cross-Cultural....................................... 417 
D. It Enables Law Students to See Things From 
a Different Perspective .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 418 
E. For The Fun of It......................................... 419 
IV. A PEDAGOGIC CONCLUSION .................... ...... .. .. .. .. .. ... 420 
The issue I have been asked to address-why law school 
professors should teach intemational family law as part of the 
conflicts course--really consists of three separate questions. 
Accordingly, this essay is divided into three parts; the fourth part 
is a brief pedagogic conclusion. 
I. WHY TEACH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS MATERIALS? 
The conflicts course has been hidebound for many years. 
The basic troika of jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments gets 
covered well enough, but the overwhelming emphasis is on United 
States law. Both the conflicts casebook and the professor usually 
give only a passing reference to intemational problems. 
That chauvinism is unwise in today's world. No longer is 
intemationallitigation conducted only by Wall Street mega-firms; 
practitioners everywhere and anywhere may find themselves 
immersed in the intricacies of taking a deposition in Belgium, 
applying Korean contract law in a Maryland state court, or 
enforcing a Greek judgment in a federal court in Tennessee. 
Unfortunately, few schools offer, and even fewer wannabe 
litigators take, specialized courses in intemationallitigation. Law 
professors do their students a disservice if they do not expose 
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them to international materials in conflicts, the most likely 
general course for exposure to this topic. 
International conflicts materials also provide a valuable 
contrast to the way things are done in the United States. We 
American conflicts scholars are a particularly parochial lot; 
obsessed with fascinating trivia such as what Brainerd Currie 
really meant, American conflicts scholars focus on their own 
narrow view of the world. The rest of the world, the Europeans in 
particular, have been dealing with these problems for centuries. 
It is possible that American conflict scholars can learn something 
from them. 1 It is time to teach how other societies handle the 
problems that cross sovereign boundaries. 
II. WHY TEACH FAMILY LAW? 
I have been astonished-and horrified-to learn in recent 
years that many conflicts professors do not teach the family law 
section of their conflicts casebook.2 That lacuna astonishes me 
because family law issues raise enormously important (and 
interesting) public policy questions. For example, must a court 
have personal jurisdiction over both parents before it can enter a 
custody decree entitled to full faith and credit?3 Family law 
conflicts issues are even more fun because they often involve 
areas considered well settled. Family law matters also provide a 
remarkably good review of issues covered in the jurisdiction and 
judgments parts of the course. For example, is the minimum 
contacts test satisfied when a state asserts personal jurisdiction 
over a man whose only contact with the forum is that the act of 
conception occurred (or may have occurred) there? 
I am horrified that family law issues are not taught more 
widely in conflicts courses because this area is the one where 
1. Conflicts parochialism is particularly puzzling given the rich and 
sophisticated history of conflicts jurisprudence among the Dutch and the Italian 
city states. 
2. If they don't teach family and international matters, how do they fill up 
three credits? Jurisdiction does not take very long because it is a reprise of first 
year civil procedure, and full faith and credit has long been settled law. That 
leaves choice of law, and how long can one really spend exploring the mysteries of 
the true conflict and the gospel according to St. Brainerd? Surely conflicts 
courses are not being filled out by learned discussions about multi-state estate 
planning or the pseudo-corporation doctrine. 
3. See DAVID VERNON Er AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS732-36 (1990). 
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most American litigants and their lawyers are likely to encounter 
the insanities produced by our federal system of judicial 
govemment. The policy-makers that are trained in law school 
should be familiar with family law issues and their horrible 
consequences for United States citizens, especially the poor. 
Professors are also policy-makers, and obviously should be aware 
of these issues as well. Moreover, many litigators will encounter 
family law matters in practice, which means that they will also 
encounter interstate family law matters. Professors should 
prepare future litigators for this possibility. Finally, family law is 
one of the only areas in conflicts in which statutory solutions are 
important. It is useful for law students to study how legislative 
bodies have reacted to these complex problems. 
Unfortunately, these legislative solutions are a primary 
reason why conflicts professors skip family law. Three major 
statutes must be mastered: the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act (URESA),4 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA), and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
(UIFSA).5 The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) should 
also be studied. 6 Academics just do not like complex statutes7 
and, as a result, often avoid teaching these family law statutes in 
conflicts courses. 
III. WHY TEACH INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW? 
Because family and international law issues are very 
important, international family law issues should be taught in 
conflicts courses. To elaborate, international family law should be 
4. UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENI' OF SUPPORT Acr, 9B U.L.A. 553 (1958) 
(hereinafter URESA]. An amended and widely adopted version of URESA can be 
found at REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT Acr, 9B U.L.A. 381 
(1968) (hereinafter RURESA). See generally INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT REMEDIES 
(Margaret C. Haynes & G. Diane Dodson eds., 1989). 
5. UNIF. CHILD CUSJ'ODY JURISDICTION Acr, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968) (hereinafter 
UCCJA]. There is good news for the statute-phobic professor-the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act. UNJF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr, 9 U.L.A. 121 
pocket part (1992) [hereinafter UIFSA]. Because so many states have adopted 
UIFSA, URESA really does not need to be taught anymore. An excellent 
description and analysis of UIFSA can be found in John J. Sampson, Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (With Unofficial Annotations}, 27 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1993) 
(Professor Sampson was a co-reporter ofUIFSA). 
6. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980). 
7. Except for the tax professors-but they're probably not regarded as 
real academics anyway precisely because they focus on a code. 
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taught because the issues are important, liberating, cross-
cultural, and just plain fun. 
A. It's Important 
Family law disputes often do not seem interesting. To some, 
they lack the high drama of products liability cases. Family law 
matters can be very important, however. For example, unpaid 
child support obligations in the United States amount to many 
billions of dollars. The burden of the system's failure falls 
overwhelmingly on the poor and the helpless. 
The importance of family law litigation skyrockets when the 
disputing parties cross national boundaries. The extraordinary 
expenses of international litigation-both in terms of travel and 
counsel fees-make it imperative that the court get it right the 
flrst time. There is no room for error; the parties do not have the 
resources to try again. 
Avoiding error is primarily the responsibility of the lawyers 
and judges. Nevertheless, the training they (and their assistants) 
receive in law school classes can play a vital role in that endeavor. 
Teaching international family law, therefore, can help reduce, 
albeit in a small way, the sum of human misery. 
B. It's Liberating 
International family law brings to the classroom problems 
that are free from the constraints imposed by the United States 
Constitution. This may be most noticeable when questions arise 
concerning recognition of judgments from foreign countries. The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause has taken almost all of the mystery 
out of those questions in United States litigation. 8 Getting a 
judgment from a foreign country recognized is a different matter, 
however. Divorce law provides an excellent example of this 
phenomenon. 
For half a century it has been well settled that recognition 
must be given to a divorce rendered by a court in the United 
States with subject matter jurisdiction, that is, by a court in a 
state where one of the parties is domiciled. 9 Because domicile in 
this context has become virtually meaningless as anything other 
8. See generally William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 
53 MD. L. REV. 412 (1994). 
9. Williamsv. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
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than a technical pleading requirement, 10 "suitcase divorces" have 
long been a fact of United States family law.11 
The issues are not so clear, however, when the divorce is 
anything other than a divorce rendered in the United States. It is 
quite obvious that many courts in this country maintain their 
traditional hostility toward divorces granted to United States 
citizens by foreign tribunals. Freed from the shackles of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, American state courts became quite 
Victorian in their reactions to divorce. This reaction provokes 
fascinating discussion. 
The distinction between "quickie" American divorces and 
"quickie" foreign divorces raises fundamental jurisprudential 
concerns in a context that facilitates good class discussion. Why 
should a Dominican Republic divorce be treated \vith less respect 
than one rendered in Delaware? Why should a state not extend 
comity to a foreign divorce? Should a state distinguish between 
foreign unilateral and bilateral divorces?12 If public policy is the 
answer, what are the sources of this policy?13 Why, in other 
words, should a foreign divorce be harder to enforce successfully 
than a domestic divorce? Would the result be different if the 
Dominican Republic were a rich and industrialized member of the 
"Group of Seven"? Many of these issues arise in the context of 
the "Incidental Question"; should those issues be treated 
differently? These are fun problems to explore. 14 
10. See, e.g., Rymanowski v. Rymanowski, 249 A.2d 407 (R.I. 1969) 
(person challenging foreign divorce bears heavy burden of proof). See generally 
E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Recognition as to Marital Status of Foreign Divorce 
Decree Attacked on Ground of Lack of Domicile, Since Williams Decision, 28 
A.L.R.2d 1303 (1953). 
11. See generally David Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 34 
U. CHI. L. REV. 26 (1967) 
12. The question here is whether a consenting respondent can waive, by 
his or her conduct, the requirement of domicile. The case law gives this question 
short shrift. But see Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, J., 
dissenting), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). 
13. A great discussion vehicle is Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E. 2d 709 
(N.Y. 1965), a rare case bucking the trend, in which the court ignored clear 
evidence of domestic policy in order to recognize a foreign divorce. The discussion 
of policy in the non-recognition cases is almost always non-existent. See, e.g., 
Estate ofStepke, 222 N.W. 2d 628 (Wis. 1974). 
14. Choice of law in divorce recognition is another interesting topic. See, 
e.g., Succession of Cohen, 480 So.2d 1059 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); Rosen v. 
Sitner, 418 A.2d 490 (Pa. Super. 1980). Other fascinating issues include the 
availability of forum non conveniens in divorce, e.g., Jagger v. Superior Court, 96 
Cal. App. 3d 579, 158 Cal. Rptr. 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); and whether a state 
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Equally intriguing are questions involving _aliens who are 
American domiciliaries and who wish to obtain a divorce in a 
United States court. Should the United States court entertain the 
action? Should it dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds? Is 
there any real difference between these cases and cases in which 
the petitioner is only technically domiciled in the forum? 
C. It's Cross-Cultural 
A third reason to teach international family law is that it 
offers students a different perspective. Students and professors 
are exposed to different ways of doing things, ways that are 
strange and fun. Custody provides a good example. 
United States custody law at one time was characterized by 
great judicial discretion that often took the form of hostility to 
custody decisions made elsewhere. Now, a sophisticated and 
well-elaborated statutory scheme, the UCCJA, controls interstate 
custody matters.15 The UCCJA combines rules, discretion, and 
strong deference to the first court to obtain subject matter 
jurisdiction. 16 
International custody matters are governed by what is 
commonly known as the Hague Convention on International Child 
Abduction (Hague Convention).17 The Convention takes a non-
discretionary approach to enforcement: an outstanding custody 
order must be honored. One familiar with the history of child 
custody litigation in the United States might wonder how 
parochial United States courts will be in interpreting this strong 
mandate. How readily, in other words, will the few loopholes in 
this Convention be exploited to further the interests of United 
States parents? Will United States courts be as willing to return 
can divorce a resident alien, e.g., Abou-Issa v. Abou-Issa, 189 S.E. 2d 443 (Ga. 
1974). 
15. See UCCJA, supra note 5. 
16. Id. 
17. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980). This Convention has been ratified by more 
than thirty states including the United States. The U.S. Congress' implementing 
legislation is found at International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
11601 et seq. (1989) [hereinafter ICARA). See generally Linda J. Silberman, 
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Brief Overview and Case Law 
Analysis, 28 FAM. L.Q. 9 (1994); Carol S. Bruch, The Central Authority's Role 
Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: A Friend in Deed, 28 FAM. L.Q. 35 
(1994). 
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a child raised in the United States to Hungary as they would be to 
return a Hungarian child? 
Many other fascinating questions can be raised. What effect 
does the Hague Convention have, for example, when a separate 
custody action is brought in the United States following a custody 
determination by a foreign court? Can a United States court 
exercise jurisdiction regarding the removal of a child from a 
foreign state? Or does the foreign decision "preempt" the exercise 
of jurisdiction by all United States courts?18 Can a child be 
wrongfully removed from one state if the removal occurs before 
the courts of that state have acquired jurisdiction over the case?19 
What will happen when the existing custody order requires 
sending the child to a state that customarily denies due process 
or engages in practices that United States courts would deem 
abhorrent? What happens, as Linda Silberman writes, when the 
child will be returned to a lesbian couple in Denmark?20 Or, as 
more states ratify the Convention, what if the child will be sent to 
a state where he or she will work full time as a rug weaver 
beginning at age eight?21 
D. It Enables Law Students to See Things 
From a Different Perspective 
The cross-cultural rewards of international family law do not 
require a literal border crossing; the subject also provides an 
illuminating insight into our own culture. 
Teaching international family law often leads to reading texts 
written by non-conflicts scholars. Their comments on the 
collective efforts of conflicts scholars can be quite scathing. The 
leading textbook on family law, for example, makes this statement 
in a discussion about the recognition of foreign state divorces: 
"The cases recognizing these bilateral migratory divorces have 
been heavily criticized by scholars of the conflict of laws. 
Criticism may be justified from the viewpoint of conflict of laws 
18. For one court's answer, see L.H. v. Youth Welfare Office of Wiesbaden, 
Germany, 568 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (Fam. Ct. 1991) (prior German ruling did not 
foreclose New York court from hearing cases; nevertheless, court found that it 
lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJA). 
19. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993) (removal is 
wrongful if the first state is the "habitual residence" of the child under the Hague 
Convention). 
20. See Silberman, supra note 17, at 32. 
21. See generally id. at 31-34 (discussing similar hypotheticals). 
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theory, whatever that may be, but there is a more important 
consideration. . . . "22 The closed world of conflicts scholars can 
be too self-congratulatory at times; it is useful to see conflicts as 
other do. 
E. For The Fun Of It 
Wild and wacky problems are sometimes encountered in 
international family law. What is one to make of Dalig Singh Bir 
and his multiple wives?23 Similarly, how does one comprehend 
the spectacle of United States courts recognizing, without a First 
Amendment shiver, divorces made by a rabbinical court?24 
One sideshow involves the treaties entered into by the 
sovereign state of California with a number of foreign 
governments. California entered into these treaties with the tacit 
encouragement of the federal government, even though the spirit, 
and probably the language, of the United States Constitution 
forbids an "agreement" between a state and a "foreign power" 
without congressional consent. 25 California and other states have 
been driven to this extra-constitutional expedient by the 
disgraceful refusal of the federal government to address the 
terrible difficulties the United States federal system of governance 
imposes on the collection of child support across state and 
international borders. 26 The story is fascinating to tell in class 
(it's certainly a lot more fun than another guest statute case or 
yet another hypothetical about long-arm jurisdiction), and it 
addresses an increasingly common and vital subject. 
Finally, consider the prospect of a Hague Convention on 
Inter-Country Adoption. This prospect raises a variety of 
interesting issues for discussion27 involving basic policy. One 
proposed rule would permit the mother's consent, but only after 
22. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 433 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis added). 
23. See Estate ofBir, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948). 
24. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 128 N.Y.S. 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1911). 
25. The story is well told in Gloria Folger DeHart, Comity, Conventions, and 
the Constitution: State and Federal Initiatives in International Support Enforcement, 
28 FAM. L.Q. 89 (1994). Ms. DeHart is the genius behind this concept. 
26. The situation is improving somewhat. See id. at 105-08. However, we 
still have a long way to go. 
27. Hague Convention on Co-Operation in Respect of IntercountJ:y 
Adoption, final act May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993). Consent may not be 
"induced by payment or compensation of any kind." Id. ch. II, art. 4(c)(4). 
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birth.28 How will this affect litigation in United States courts 
involving adoption made before the Convention, or involving a 
child from a non-signatory state? 
One additional subject area that creates fascinating 
classroom discussion involves tribal courts. United States law 
accords Native American tribal courts a form of "sovereign" 
status. 29 This means, among other things, that decisions of tribal 
courts are entitled to full preclusive effect in other courts of the 
United States.30 The interaction among tribal, state, and federal 
courts is a fascinating and virtually unexplored area of 
"international" law. Because of the large number of people 
involved, conflicting assertions of jurisdiction between tribal and 
state courts are a headache in family law. Unfortunately, this 
problem is rarely explored in either academic literature or the 
classroom. 31 
N. A PEDAGOGIC CONCLUSION 
Conflicts courses need to expose students to serious 
discussion of both international and family law. These issues are 
important, interesting, and provide a new perspective from which 
to examine the assumptions of United States conflicts laws. 
Better yet, this subject area offers terrific teaching material. 
Students really like these topics and they provide a particularly 
useful review at the end of the semester. Because they are so 
much fun, topics in international family law are really good for a 
class afflicted with end of the semester blues. So, go forth into 
the classroom and teach international family law; your students 
and your evaluations will benefit. 
28. See generally Peter H. Pfund, Inter-Country Adoption: The 1993 Hague 
Convention: Its Purpose, Implementation, and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53 (1994). 
29. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). See 
also June Melvin Mickens, Interaction Between State and Tribal Child Support 
Systems, 6 AM. J. FAM. L. 185 (1992). 
30. Assuming, of course, that the requisite jurisdictional findings have 
been made. 
31. The American Bar Association has recently sponsored a set of model 
treaties concerning child support to be entered into by state and tribal 
governments. For a brief discussion of the recognition problems created by Native 
American divorces, see ClARK, supra note 22, at 420-21. 
